For decision problems in the real world, states of nature, information, and actions should be viewed as fuzzy events. The application of the fuzzy sets theory and the statistical decision theory to the decision problems in fuzzy events leads to a specific formulation of fuzzy decision problems and the definitions of entropy, worth of information, and quantity of information. Some results which are analogous to those in the statistical decision theory are given in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Although the theory of decision problems with probabilistic uncertainty has been studied in detail by DeGroot (1970) and by Kullback (1959) , much of the decision-making in the real world takes place in a fuzzy environment. The present paper deals with a fuzzy decision problem in which we can regard states of nature, feasible actions, and available information as fuzzy events given by Zadeh (1968) . An example of fuzzy states may be described by such expressions as "It will be warm," "It will be cool," etc. This fuzziness stems from such adjectives as "warm," "cool," etc. Since fuzzy states are defined on a probability space, the decision problems in fuzzy events are related to both fuzziness and randomness.
The application of the fuzzy sets theory and the statistical decision theory to the decision problems in fuzzy events leads to a specific formulation of fuzzy decision problems and to the definitions of entropy, worth of information, and quantity of information. From these definitions this paper explains some results concerning perfect, probabilistic, and fuzzy information, which are analogous to those in the statistical decision theory. In other words, we have tried to extend some of the statistical decision theory to decision problems involving fuzzy events in this paper. Although a reason of considering the decision problems involving fuzzy events essentially lies in advantages similar to those discussed by Zadeh (1965) and by Fung and Fu (1973) , there are some specific advantages arising from our formulation of the decision problem.
I~ROBABILITY OF FUZZY EVENTS
Let S and S' be sets of events {st,... , sn} and {s't,..., s'~} with probabilities ~(si) and ~'(s'j), respectively. Fuzzy events A and B are fuzzy sets on S and S' whose membership functions/x A and/x B are Borel mesurable. Let ~(si, s'j) be a joint probability of si and s'¢. The following relations are given by Zadeh (1968) .
where P(A) is called the probability Of fuzzy event A, P(A, B) is called the joint probability of fuzzy events A and B, and so forth. The following will be used later. 
DECISION PROBLEMS IN Fuzzy EVENTS i
A statistical decision problem is generally represented in the form of the ordered 4-tuple (S, D, ~, u') where S = {s i .... , sn} is a set of states of nature, D = {d 1 ,..., d~} is a set of actions, ~(') is a probability density function on S, and u'(-, -) is a utility function on S × D. : :Similarly, let us define a decision problem in fuzzy events as the ordered 5-tuple (o~, s], f, u, g) where ~-= {F1,..., Fr} is a set of fuzzy, states which are fuzzy events on S, d = {A t ,..., Aq} is a set of fuzzy actions which are fuzzy events on D, u(., .) i s a utility function on d × o~, and g(-) is a function mapping from a set D to [0, 1] which represents a preference ordering over a set of actions such that the larger g(di) is, the more preferable d i is. It should noted that regardless of the value of utility function, g(di) is determined by an individual subjective judgement.
In view of the definition of probability of fuzzy events, G(A~) = ~ t~&(dk) g(d~), for _d~ ~ s#' te may represent a preference ordering over a set of fuzzy actions ~. The function G(') is normalized as follows:
The function P~(') can be regarded as a subjective measure for the preference order of actions, which is assumed to be independently of the value of utility function.
First of all, let us assume that ff and u(', -) are Specified in the following manner:
(i) There exists a partition on o ~ such that ~t3 ""U~ = o ~-, ~/(3 ~. = ~ for i @ j and each ~/is orthogonal. Here, ~ is orthogonal if and only if ~2F,~,/@j(S1~) = 1 for all sk a S.
• (ii) Each utility function u~(', -) is defined on ~/ X ~ and a total utility function u(', .) is the sum of utility functions {ui(', ")}.
As such an example that the assumptions are satisfied, consider the problem in which we have to decide whether we order an article or not. In the present case, for instance, o ~ = {~, ~, ~} may be expressed by such classes as ~ = (good quality, sufficient, poor}, ~ = (good design, sufficient, poor}, and ~ = {short time for delivery, ordinary, long}. The words "good quality," "good design," and "short time for delivery" may belong to essentially different classes. Taking account of classes of adjectives {good, sufficient, poor} and {short, ordinary, long}, it will be possible to define the fuzzy sets in each ~ such that the orthogonal condition is satisfied. Thus it should be noted that a family of sets {~} is a partition of ~-and each ~ forms a partition on S in a sence such that ~ i s orthogonal. Furthermore it is reasonable from the above to define the total utility as the sum of utility functions {ui(" , ')}.
Each ui(. , .) can be obviously replaced with a utility function u(-, ")on d × ~ such that u(dk,/vj) = ui(dk, t~.) for F~ ~ 4. In what follows, we use u(-, ") instead of ui(', ") for simple notation.
The above assumptions suggest the following definition.
DEFINITION 1. A total utility of fuzzy action A i is

U(A,) = ~ Po(A~) u(d~ , F~) P(Ps).
An optimal decision can be defined as a fuzzy action A0 which maximizes
Note that the optimal decision A 0 is a fuzzy set. Let X = {xt .... , x~} be a message space. Throughout this paper it is assumed that a conditional probability f(xj Ih) is known. From Bayes' Formula the posterior probability can be written by
, the total utility of A~ given a message xj is
where P(F~ ] x~.) is the conditional probability of F~ given xj. Thus the optimal decision A~j can be defined by
Let us define probabilistic information e as observing the value of a random variable £. The total utility for having the information e is U(Ae 1~) = Z U(A~, Ixj)f(xj). J It is natural from the statistical decision theory that the worth of information e is written in the form v(e) = u(A~ I e) -U(Ao).
Note that the worth of information V(e) has been estimated before the information e is obtained. Now consider the information which let us exactly know a true state s~. This information will be called probabilistic perfect information and denoted by e~. If the information e~ is availabIe, its total utility for having the information e~ is It is easy from these definitions to prove the following proposition.
Next we consider a fuzzy message M which is a fuzzy event on X. Let us define fuzzy information E as observing a fuzzy message from {M, _~r}. From the same point of view the total utility of A i given M is
where P(FjlM) is the conditional probability of F~ given M, and the optimal decision AM can be given by
Then the total utility for having the fuzzy information E can be formulated as
U(A~ I f/I) = U(A u I M) P(M) + U(AI~21 ~) P(M)
which corresponds to that of the probabilistic information e. DEFINITION 2. The worth of fuzzy information E is In fuzzy information, we consider the information which let us know what states {F~} occur with probability 1. This information will be called fuzzy perfect information E® which corresponds to the probabilistic perfect information e~o. To avoid the complexity of proofs we, however, limit ourselves to the simple case that given fuzzy perfect information E~o implies that P(Fj)= I and P(Fk) = 0 for all k ~ j. Even if E~ implies that P(Ft) .... = P(F~) = 1 and P(F~) ----0 for k > j, it will be intuitively understood from the limited case that the following propositions still are satisfied.
In view of the above, the utility of Ai can be represented as U(Ai[Fj) -= Pg(Ai) u (Ai, Fj) . The optimal decision Ae, can be defined by
Thus the total utility for having the fuzzy perfect information E~o is
PROPOSITION 3. V(E~) >/ V(E).
This proposition can be easily derived from Definitions 2 and 3. Proof. The proof of (i) is evident from definitions of V(E:o) and V(e~o).
Hence we witl show you only the proof of (ii). 
U(A~2
v(E~) > V(e~) > r(~) > v(E) > o.
It might be said that the relation V(e) >~ V(E) is caused by the fact that the information E has fuzziness in addition to randomness which the information e has. On the other hand, the relation V(E~) >~ V(e~) is caused by the fact that our interest is not in S but in Y which is a set of our concerned events on S. This result will be intuitionally agreed on by all.
QUANTITY OF INFORMATION IN FUZZY EVENTS
Let --log P(A) be a measure of uncertainty of fuzzy event A and let the expected value of --log P(A) be a entropy of fuzzy event A.
DEFINITION 4. The entropy of fuzzy event A is
H(A) = --P(A) log P(A) --P(A) log P(A).
The conditional probability of A given a message ~ = xj becomes P(A ] x~).
Consequently, the conditional entropy of fuzzy event A given the information e can be represented as Similarly, the conditional entropy of fuzzy event A given the fuzzy information E can be represented as
H(A ] M) = H(_d ] M) P(M) q-H(A ] M) P(M).
PROPOSITION 5. (i) H(A) >~ H(A[ 2), (ii) H(A ] 2,5) <~ H(A f ~) + H(A I ~).
Proof. It is easy to prove (i) from Lemma 1 by using the fact that log x ~<
x --1 for x > 0. For (ii), suppose that ~(', ") is a joint probability density function 2 and .9. Then we have 1{ -e(A, ,) l v(A I B) H log P(A, B) --P(A, B) log P(A, B) , 
(A, B) = --P(A, B) log P(A, B) --P(A, B) log P(A, B)
--P(A, B)
so
I(e) = H(o~) --H(~ ~) I(E) = H(o ~) --H(o ~ 3/i)
The following proposition can be immediately proved from Propositions 5 and 6. ..,Y~} are two probabilistic information sources, and E~ and E u mea n taking an average by probabilistic variables x andy, respectively. Since we can regard two fuzzy information sources E 1 = {M 1 , ]1//1} and E 2 = {Ms, 1142} as kinds of probabilistic variables and the quantity of fuzzy information source I(.) is a convex function, we can easily obtain Proposition 8 in applying the above relation to a fuzzy case [for example, see Miyazawa's book (1971) ].
We conclude this section with a few remarks concerning experiments. The word "experiment" is used here in a sence such that we obtain a message xj, First, letting X~ = (x 1 ,..., x~) be a sequence of experiments, we introduce four sets S 1---{s k~Slse(sklXz) >0}, S 2 ={skiS[0 <lZA(Sk)< 1},S 3 = {s~ ~ S 1/zA(s~) = 1}, and S 4 = {s k ~ S ]/xA(s~) = 0}.
Since S 1 _C S 3 implies P(A I X~) = 1 and S t C S 4 implies P(A I X~) = 0, it follows that if S1-C S 3 or S 1_C $4, then H(filX~) = 0. Thus there is no uncertainty of fuzzy event A after we carried out the experiments X~.
In the case that S, C $3, the decision maker can be convinced that the fuzzy event A occurs surely. Figure la illustrates the situation in which it is unnecessary to perform additional experiments. In the case that S 1 c~ S 2 5a ~, it follows that H(-drXz) > 0. Figure lb illustrates such a situation in which it is possible to decrease the entropy by performing additional experiments. Next, we consider the case of Fig. lb such that additional information is meaningful. It is known in the statistical decision theory that after infinite experiments Xo~ the entropy of events {s,} becomes zero.
On the other hand, it follows from the definition of entropy of fuzzy event A that
where 3 i is a true state. Thus, the uncertainty expressed as H(.dl X~ ) > 0 still remains after infinite experiments Jfoo if si E S 2 . The entropy given Xoo is similar to that without randomness in De Luca and Termini (1972) . After infinite experiments Xoo we see that the uncertainty of fuzzy event A does not arise from the randomness of {si}, but from the fuzziness of meaning of the word "A."
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
We conclude this paper with summing up the meanings of this approach for formulating decision problems as follows:
(i) There are many actual decision problems such that it is necessary only to decide approximately ~ what actions should be selected. An optimal fuzzy action A 0 obtained in this paper might show such a guiding principle in our actions.
(ii) It is reasonable that we consider the fuzzy state space ~-consisted of allF~ rather than the state space S, where each Fi is expressed by our interested words on S. For example, consider a decision problem in which we have to tell whether we approve of the plan to build up an atomic power plant. Let S = {si} be a set of quantities of radioactive contamination from this plant. Even if we know that some state s~ occurs with probability one, our interest is only in whether the state s~ is safe for us or not. Therefore it is reasonable to analize this decision problem on the fuzzy state space • : {FI, F2, F3} : {sufficiently safe, approximately safe, otherwise} rather than on S, where F, is given by the orthogonal condition of o~.
(iii) Since most of information in the real world is fuzzy, we have more to do with fuzzy information rather than non-fuzzy information. Furthermore, there are many cases in which we must deal with fuzzy information even when we get non-fuzzy information. For example, even if we obtain the information which tells us that the quantity of a polluted material is x ppm, we must discuss how we interpret this x ppm. That leads to convert decisive information to fuzzy information. Thus it is necessary to view non-fuzzy information as fuzzy information defined by the meanings of non-fuzzy information. (v) Since the "experiment" is to obtain a message, it makes no sense to repeat many experiments at a great cost in the situation where the meanings of events are very fuzzy. From the degree of uncertainty of the "fuzzy" nature we, hence, can judge whether it is meaningful to repeat more experiments or not.
It follows from the above point of view that our intuitive concept of decision may be well reflected in our formulation of decision problems in a fuzzy environment. RECEIVED: January 24, 1975; REVISED: September 16, 1977 
